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Lying and Cheating, or Self-Help and Civil-Disobedience?
Aditi Bagchi1
May poor sellers lie to rich buyers? This Article argues that,
under limited circumstances, sellers may indeed have a
license to lie about their goods. Where sellers are losers
under unjust background institutions and they reasonably
believe that buyers have more than they would under just
institutions, lies that result in de minimum transfers can be
regarded as a kind of self-help. More generally, what we owe
each other in our interpersonal interactions depends on the
institutional backdrop. Consumer contract law, including its
enforcement regimes, should recognize the social and
political contingency of sellers’ obligations to buyers. In
other contexts, too, we must adjust what we demand of one
another to take into account existing justice deficits.
Imagine you are a tourist in a large city. Although it is not freezing
at the moment, you stop to purchase an attractive scarf from a street vendor.
The vendor describes the scarf as 100% cashmere and asks $25 for the scarf.
A cashmere scarf will usually cost at least $50. However, this scarf is made
of polyester and a polyester scarf of comparable quality and design will
normally sell for $5.
Many of us would say that the seller is lying and cheating. He is lying
when he tells you the scarf is cashmere and he is cheating you by charging
five times the market price for the scarf, which is not the price he would
charge a savvier local. By paying more than market price, you are deprived
of the opportunity to spend the money on something else. If you would not
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have purchased a polyester scarf for $25 even if that were the market price,
then you are actually worse off as a result of the transaction. 2
But let us add additional facts to the scenario. Imagine the seller is
poor and imagine you are rich. Assume that you are part of the same political
society, and assume too that this society does not meet its obligations of
distributive justice.3 Without specifying what distributive justice requires, let
us suppose that you would be less rich and he would be less poor under just
institutions. The amount by which you are set back in the transaction in
question is negligible in relation either to your ‘excess’ property under unjust
institutions or the seller’s deficit. Does it make any difference to how you
judge his conduct toward you?
Some readers will be certain that lying and cheating are morally
reprehensible and the political economy against which it takes place is
irrelevant. Others, though, may recall uncomfortable moments (perhaps in
foreign countries) where you found yourself negotiating with someone over
what turned out to be a few cents and realized that those cents mattered a
great deal more to the seller than to you. Some readers may want to know
more.4 Just how poor is the seller? Just how rich am I supposed to be? And
how did I get rich and how did he get poor? On some answers to these
questions, some might conclude that overcharging a privileged buyer is a
legitimate form of self-help.5
Inasmuch a seller flagrantly and
unapologetically declines to defer to unjust entitlements or the rules of an
unjust market, he may be engaged in civil disobedience. 6
I will argue that the seller is lying but not cheating. However, his
lying is probably justified and should give rise to limited legal recourse. My
2

On a preference theory of well-being, this is true even if the buyer never learns of the
deceit. See Shelly Kagan, NORMATIVE ETHICS 109 (1998) (discussing variety of harms
that flow from lies).
3
Many people who do not agree on abstract principles of justice will agree that the United
States is not presently compliant with the demands of distributive justice (again, we will
not agree on the degree of noncompliance). See Kate Andrias, An American Approach to
Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J.
616, 619 (2019) (“There is now widespread consensus that economic inequality in the
United States poses a growing and grave problem.”).
4
That is, while some might regard lying as categorically wrong, others are prepared to
make circumstantial allowances that license lying under particular circumstances. The
United States appears particularly hospitable to and forgiving of fraud as compared to other
Western countries. See Edward Balleisen, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM
TO MADOFF 5 (2017).
5
See infra Part IIB.
6
See infra Part IIC.
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argument for that conclusion will incorporate the idea that his conduct can be
characterized as self-help. More generally, I will suggest that the political
morality of background institutions shapes the private ethics of bilateral
exchange. In making the case, I hope to illustrate two points, which do not
stand or fall together. First, interpersonal private moral obligation depends
on background political justice. Second, interpersonal legal obligations
(private law obligations) should also depend on background political justice.
The overall picture is one where much of what is owed between individuals
depends on background justice; injustice moves bilateral relationships out of
ideal theory. It may not be impossible to be good against a backdrop of
injustice but our deliberations about what morality requires of us vis a vis
other individuals cannot proceed without taking politics into account, if not
at every turn, then at some exhausting frequency.
The hypothetical around which the discussion proceeds is intended to
be neither the easiest nor the hardest case for remedial lying. Consider two
other cases in which lying is easier and harder, respectively, to defend. May
a prospective employee lie to an employer about her race, religion, sex or
family status? Although it is not legally permitted7, it is possible to justify
lying about this information as a means of protection against discrimination,
even if lying is otherwise culpable.8 Many of us would consider this an easier
case than the starting hypothetical. Although the employee protects herself
against discrimination based on her social knowledge, her lie does not usually
harm the employer unless he would engage in discrimination himself. The
employer does not misrepresent any information to which the employer is
7

See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 23 S.E.2d 372, 378 (S.C. 1942) (“[I]t is agreed that
an informed vendee must limit himself to silence in order to escape the imputation of fraud.
If in addition to the party's silence there is any statement, even in word or act on his part,
which tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of
the other party's attention or observation from the real facts, the line is overstepped, and the
concealment becomes fraudulent.”).
8
Ariel Porat and Omri Yadlin argue that lying by job applicants about protected
information should be legally permitted as a means by which to protect the policy that
underlies a right of nondisclosure. A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, 91 INDIANA L. J. 617
(2016). Narrowly understood, their argument does not apply to the central hypothetical of
this essay because lying by the vendor does not fall into any of their four delineated
categories of potentially permissible lies. Id. at 661-62.
Nevertheless, Porat and Yadlin’s arguments, broadly conceived, may recommend
a tolerant attitude with respect to lies even outside the circumstances they discuss. Their
arguments seem to endorse welfare-promoting lies, generally. Neither my hypothetical nor
our collective knowledge of the lives of buyers and sellers is detailed enough to allow any
confident conclusion in this regard. My own arguments in defense of lying by vendors
does not depend on the supposition that such lies promote even the material interests of
vendors, let alone welfare at large.
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entitled. A discriminatory employer wrongs an applicant by acting on her
misrepresentation but a prospective buyer has not and will not wrong the
seller in that way. While even this “easy” case raises difficult questions, there
is, at least, no conflict between institutional justice and individual morality.
The employee’s lie can be justified by the prospect of a bilateral wrong, or a
direct interpersonal wrong to the applicant by the employer; by contrast, the
street vendor’s lie cannot be justified by any bilateral wrongdoing of the
buyer.9
Consider next a pickpocket who steals from apparently rich people
she finds on the street. It is harder to justify that kind of stealing because the
person on the street has no particular responsibility for any incremental harm
to the pickpocketer. By contrast, because we can expect a buyer in a
competitive market to walk away with most of the gains from trade, we can
expect that the buyer in our central hypothetical would gain more from a
transaction unmarred by lies than would the seller, thereby exacerbating the
inequality between them—even absent specific wrongdoing by the buyer.
We might also distinguish the pickpocketer on the grounds that we
have reason to regard property entitlements as generally more robust than
contract expectations. This might not be true under conditions of extreme
injustice that undermine the legitimacy of all conventional entitlements that
originate and are primarily backed by the state.10 But we are concerned with
more moderate circumstances in which the state as a whole is not illegitimate;
we are concerned with states of ‘moderate injustice’ in which there is no

9

I do consider infra the possibility that exchange at market price against the background of
unjust institutions might constitute a wrong but most of this essay does not take that
conclusion for granted. However, without establishing culpability, the arguments of this
essay do hinge on assigning moral responsibility to a buyer for a transaction and its terms.
10
Tommie Shelby has recently argued that the United States may be so deeply unjust that
the social order “cannot reasonably expect allegiance from [the] oppressed group.” D ARK
GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT AND REFORM 215 (2016). In particular, while natural duties
persist in an unjust regime, “taking the possessions of others, especially when these others
are reasonably well off, may be permissible.” Id. at 220.
For a defense of an insulated private law on the assumption that our society meets
the requisite standard of legitimacy, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 93 (1995) (“(“[A] requirement that unjust losses be
rectified only makes sense provided holdings are not entirely unjust.”); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 259
(Peter Benson ed., 2001) (“Contract law as an institution is acceptable only if the basic
structure of the society is fair. If the basic social structure is unfair, rules designed in part to
accomplish corrective justice within that structure, including the rules of contract law, may
not be justifiable.”).
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general right by any group to disregard the law entirely. 11 It is difficult for a
legal system to cope with more radical illegitimacy since the very act of
deciding cases under law could amount to complicity. 12 But legal systems do
and should be responsive to moderate injustice because it is then within the
power of courts to render the exercise of state power more just on the
margin.13 Whether because of their positional constraints or for other
sociological reasons, most legal systems recognize themselves as imperfect
but not radically unjust.
Within the context of moderate injustice, most legal regimes treat
contractual and property entitlements differently. Most notably, the
consequences for theft are very different than for breach of contract or
misrepresentation in sales.14 Many of the reasons that justify treating a
pickpocket differently than a dishonest seller derive from this more general
distinction. First, involuntary takings of physical property often raise
concerns about personal security and even bodily integrity. 15 Second, we
have heightened expectations of stability with respect to our property, at least

11

Most of private law theory proceeds under the assumption that modern postindustrialized democracies like the United States are partially compliant but not radically
noncompliant. See, e.g., id.
12
See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210 (2d ed. 1994). See also J. C. Oleson, The
Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
669, 684 (2007); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the
Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive
Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 134 (2002).
13
See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 105 (2008)
(arguing that doctrine of unconscionability in contract is responsive to background
injustice).
14
Theft is a crime and may be punished with deprivation of liberty. The default remedy for
contract is expectation damages and misrepresentation in sales allows for rescission (and
sometimes damages). For discussion of expectation damages as basic remedy for breach of
contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) & cmt. a (1981)
(“Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces
the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he made
the contract.”); 3 E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 149-50 (3d
ed. 2004) (describing expectation damages as default remedy for contract breach). For
discussion of remedies for misrepresentation, see Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial
Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1017–18 (2003) (“The two principal civil remedies for
misrepresentation are tort damages and rescission [of contract] accompanied by restitution
of benefits conferred.”).
15
The wrong of physically taking something from someone is central to Kant’s account of
property, though he expands from there to intelligible possession. See Immanuel Kant,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:245 (ed. Mary Gregor, 2016).
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with respect to its use value, and we plan accordingly. 16 Finally, because
personal property is mobile and contracts bilateral, one can transfer things to
avoid detection of theft; it is easier to identify the party responsible when
one’s contract has gone awry. Not all of these distinctions apply across all
kinds of contract and property; our intuitions about the kind of wrong done
in contract or with respect to property also vary. Comparing the particular
cases of sales fraud and picketpocketing, we can observe that pickpocketing
is physically intrusive, the loss entirely surprising and arbitrary, and one is
unlikely ever to identify the agent of wrongdoing. We might think these
considerations operate different in other cases of theft—e.g., theft from a
local bodega—and intuitions about the morality of theft may adjust
accordingly. Because each instance of ostensible self-help introduces its own
complications, in deconstructing the fraudulent sales case, this essay does not
aim to justify other forms of self-help such as theft. Indeed, my primary aim
is not even to vindicate our particular seller but to show that the interpersonal
morality of an action, especially acts in the market, turn on the political
morality of background institutions.
Focused as it is on deconstructing a narrow hypothetical, the claims
in this essay regarding the circumstances that generate a license to lie are
tentative. Of primary significance is the more general claim that
interpersonal moral and legal obligations depend on political justice. The
more specific but modest ambitions pertain to the theory and doctrine
governing consumer sales. First, I hope to upset the usual (but not universal)
assumption that consumers are the vulnerable party in retail sales. 17 This
starting point is most plausible when the seller is a large corporation but even
in that case the picture is muddy. Matters are still messier when the seller is
socially disadvantaged but in a position to cheat some buyers. Contract
theory should not take consumer vulnerability as its starting point but develop
a more refined framework and distribute interpretive presumptions
accordingly. Second, doctrinally, I will argue that our reading of what
qualifies as a representation should be responsive to background facts of the
sort laid out above, and I will defend the existing indifference in law to
imbalance of consideration standing alone.

16

For a foundational account of the justificatory role of stability of expectations in property
theory, see David Hume, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Bk. III, Part ii, section 2.
17
Lyn K. L. Tjon Soei Len, MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE
ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS 9 (2017) (observing that the characterization
of consumers as vulnerable juxtaposes them against powerful corporations while ignoring
other parties, such as sweatshops laborers, whose interests compete with those of relative
privileged consumers).

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382019

Notably, my arguments are not instrumental. If sellers are licensed to
lie, it is not because of any imperative to actually move dollars around so that
we might achieve a moral equitable distribution.18 If lying is permitted in the
central case, it responds to a background wrong without undoing it. The
seller’s lies will have to appear analogous to a lie you might tell someone
who herself regularly lies to you. You may be licensed to lie to a liar even
though if the lying does not achieve any good. Relatedly, my analysis
concerns only the question of whether the seller wrongs the buyer by lying to
her. This means, for example, that I exclude consideration of potential
injuries to third parties, such as other vendors, that speak to whether the
seller’s lie is a wrong tout court, e.g., as a form of unfair competition that
undermines the market. A poor choice of self-defense that results in harm to
bystanders might give rise to claims by those bystanders against their injurer
but it will not obviate her defense against the original threat-maker. 19
Likewise, the fact that others might be worse off as a result of the seller’s
self-protective conduct might render his conduct ultimately wrongful but the
interests of other vendors do not render his conduct wrongful to the buyer—
and it would not be the particular wrong of lying. Of course, the interests of
others and myriad respects in which an action might be good or bad are
important to choosing a legal response. 20
It is also worth distinguishing the claim here from two others: one,
more modest; the other, more severe. First, I highlight that the argument here
stands on the premise of background injustice and any justification for the
seller’s lie derives from that injustice and not bare necessity, which may or
may not characterize unjustified inequality. Most victims of distributive
injustice in advanced industrialized democracies are not starving. Indeed,
they can probably make a living without routinely lying. Their choice to lie
about their wares to buyers may be justified nevertheless. However, I do not
go so far as to make a second, more radical claim: that sellers should have no
regret about the lies they tell.21 It might be that even if a buyer is not entitled
18

For discussion of utilitarian theories of distributive justice, see P.J. Kelly,
UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW
(1991). For a utilitarian or instrumentalist critical review of the kind of liberal account
from which I proceed, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's
Theory of Justice, in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE AND
JUSTICE Vol. 96 (1983).
19
MODEL PENAL CODE Section 3.09 (3) (negligent injury of third persons in the course of
self-defense does not preclude “prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards
innocent persons” – but it does not obviate the defense against the original aggressor).
20
See infra Part III.
21
One could go still further and claim that sellers have a duty to resist injustice by the
means available to them. Because I assume circumstances of moderate injustice, I assume
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to the truth from the seller, the seller should regret the harm he inflicts on her,
his departure from a personal practice of truth-telling, and the social
alienation to which he has contributed. Nothing in this essay is intended to
suggest otherwise. To the contrary, I will return at the end to the tragic
dimension of their encounter, one that is best understood as among the moral
fallouts of distributive injustice itself.
The first part below will set out the essential tension between the
private and public lenses on the exchange above. That is, it will elaborate the
intuition that the seller wrongs the buyer by lying and cheating and then
elaborate, separately, how the same conduct might qualify as self-help or civil
disobedience in light of background distributive injustice. The subsequent
part will attempt to reconcile these perspectives. The final part infers some
brief lessons for the law and theory of contract.
I.

The Two Perspectives

Before we can arrive at any conclusions about the duties of the seller
or the rights of the buyer in this case, it is worth investigating the prima facie,
conflicting intuitions that underwrite our dilemma. On the one hand, the
seller engages in conduct that absent atmospheric embellishment is not only
deceitful but straighforward lying. His conduct also defies ordinary
expectations that a seller will not “overcharge” a consumer that is in some
way vulnerable to exploitation, including on grounds of poor information. 22
These demands may be reflected in public law but they get off the ground in
the space of interpersonal morality. Even apart from any legal regulation of
exchange, lying and cheating are bilateral wrongs by one person against
another.23 Knowingly falsehoods are lies, and lying is prima facie wrong.
Our seller wrongs the buyer when he falsely describes a good that he aims to
sell, and by inducing her in this way to pay well over market price for the
good, he cheats her of money that she could have spent otherwise.

there is no duty to lie as a matter of resistance. Cf. Carol Hey, The Obligation to Resist
Oppression, 42 J. OF SOC. PHIL. 21 (2011) (arguing that individuals have an obligation to
resist their own oppression that is “rooted in an obligation to protect their rational nature”).
22
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 734 (1986) (arguing that consumers feel entitled to a
reference price).
23
My account is focused on this bilateral wrong of lying and whether it is defeated by
background injustice in this case. To extent lies are also wrongs to the world at large, as on
a utilitarian theory, or to oneself, on a virtue-based account, the background injustice at
issue is less likely to diffuse the wrong.

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382019

At the same time, a more sympathetic account of the seller is possible
in the domain of political morality.24 While some egalitarian accounts
purport only to describe major social institutions, or the basic structure of
society, others recognize that distributive justice implicates individual
behavior as well.25 This line of argument has two kinds of implications for
sellers. First, we might think of sellers’ behavior as directly justified on
grounds that it amounts to self-help that ameliorates large-scale distributive
injustice. It ameliorates the injustice not by undoing it in any substantial way
but, as in the case of most inadequate remedies, obtaining a reverse transfer
acknowledges the underlying injustice. Alternatively, we might characterize
buyers’ objective of extracting a generous share of the transactional surplus
as a kind of wrong that justifies defensive behavior by sellers. In either case,
the sellers’ conduct is responsive to an underlying wrong – whether collective
or individual – and can be characterized as self-help.
We could go further. To the extent sellers are flouting existing rules
of exchange that unjustly privilege already socially advantaged buyers, their
behavior can be interpreted as civil disobedience. The aim of this part is to
show how we might be tempted to think of sellers’ conduct at once as lying
and cheating, and as self-help and civil disobedience. It will be the aim of
the next part to reconcile the separate perspectives suggested by interpersonal
morality and political morality, respectively.
A. Lying and Cheating
In our hypothetical, the seller tells the buyer that the scarf is made of
cashmere although it is not. We can assume that the seller knows this. On
most definitions of lying, his assertion amounts to a lie. While most people
agree that not all lies are wrong – the favorite example is a lie to the murderer
at your door – a lie is presumptively wrong. 26 At least at first blush, it looks
like the reasons we have for regarding lying as wrongful apply in this case.

24

I am not committed here to any single theory of distributive justice, though my language
is evocative of the theory advanced by John Rawls. See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971). However, any theory of distributive justice under which the existing distribution is
unjust, and under which this amounts to a wrong to individuals disadvantaged by that
distribution, are compatible with the arguments advanced here.
25
See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
26
Because I am concerned here with lying as a wrong to the buyer, I do not consider
accounts of lying that sound solely in virtue ethics, that is, which focus on the effects of
lying on the liar’s own character.
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Alistair Macintyre locates the “evil” of lying in “its capacity for
corrupting and destroying the integrity of rational relationships.” 27 Seana
Shiffrin has said that the “wrong of lying is that it operates on a maxim that,
if it were universalized and constituted a public rule of permissible action,
would deprive us of reliable access to a crucial set of truths and a reliable way
to sort the true from the false.”28 Both authors are getting at the idea that we
rely on truthful assertions to communicate with one another and know things
about each other and the world. Lying compromises the reliability of our
assertions and thereby undermines understanding between people and of our
environment, each of which is essential to human flourishing. Sissela Bok
emphasized the importance of truthful communication to social functioning,
arguing that “trust in some degree of veracity functions as a foundation of
relations among human beings; when this trust shatters or wears away,
institutions collapse.”29. For this reason, “some level of truthfulness has
always been seen as essential to human society, no matter how deficient the
observance of other moral principles.” 30
Lying to strangers about the product you are selling impairs a
particular social institution, the market. It is an institution that is fundamental
to most modern societies. Lying to prospective buyers also erodes even that
minimalist trust that strangers in large, anonymous societies bear toward one
another. The erosion of this trust is especially insidious because the people
who encounter each other in exchanges like that described in the starting
hypothetical will rarely encounter members of the other group in other
settings, let alone cooperative contexts in which trust is implicated. So the
lessons they learn about each other in the course of a simple transaction may
endure.
One might argue that the seller’s assertions about the scarf are not lies
because they are not necessarily motivated by an intent to deceive. Maybe
the seller just wants to convey that the scarf is so soft that it could be mistaken
for cashmere. Maybe the seller does not think that the buyer will believe him.
On some definitions of lying, the intention to lead someone else to believe
the proposition at issue is “essential”.31

27

Alisdair Macintyre, TRUTHFULNESS, LIES AND MORAL PHILOSOPHERS: WHAT CAN WE
LEARN FROM MILL AND KANT? (Tanner Lectures) (1994).
28
Seana Shiffrin, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW 23 (2014).
29
Sissela Bok, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 31 (1978).
30
Id. at 19.
31
Arnold Eisenberg, AESTHETICS AND THE THEORY OF CRITICISM 249 (1973).
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However, these are implausible characterizations of the seller’s intent.
Deception is a prerequisite to the intended effect of his assertion, that is,
extracting a high price from buyer. The buyer can directly assess the softness
of the fabric but will only pay the higher price that cashmere commands if
she is persuaded that it really is cashmere, or that it might be. Even if the
seller cannot be sure that a given buyer will think it is cashmere with
sufficient certainty as to act on that belief, the seller’s aim in asserting that
the scarf is cashmere is to cause the buyer to proceed as if it were cashmere. 32
A buyer might not believe that the scarf is cashmere but harbor just enough
hope that it tips her decision to buy. That is, a buyer’s beliefs about a good
are always subject to degrees of certainty, and the seller aims here to make
the buyer more confident, even if still doubtful, about the proposition that the
scarf is cashmere. Even if the seller knows that some buyers will discount
his assertion entirely, he makes the representation with the aim of deceiving
more credulous buyers.33 Although the seller may be uncertain whether his
statement will effectively deceive a given buyer, the assertion is a lie in each
case. If I lie to everyone about whether I attended a certain gathering, the
fact that there are some people who independently know that I was there does
not save the assertion from being a lie. Similarly, the possibility that a given
buyer will not attach any weight to the seller’s assertion does not redeem it.
Since the seller cannot separate credulous and incredulous buyers in advance,
his assertion can be treated as a blanket lie.
Some definitions of lying are less focused on seller’s intent to deceive
in any event. Paul Faulkner argues that “[t]o involve its distinctive
manipulative mechanism a lie must purport to provide information to
someone who is dependent on the liar for this information.” 34 Andreas
Stokke argues that “you lie when you say something you believe to be false
and thereby propose that it become common ground.”35 These more
expansive definitions emphasize the intended reliance by the listener on the
speaker. They appear to track the kind of reliance a seller can expect from a
buyer.

32

Eisenberg specifically claims that an advertiser who describes his goods beyond its
merits in the hopes of deceiving at least some buyers is a liar. Even an advertiser who
makes exorbitant claims in order to create a “partial or subconscious belief” is a
“borderline liar.” Id. at 251.
33
See Arnold Isenberg, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, in eds. Callaghan et al,
AESTHETICS AND THE THEORY OF CRITICISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG 251
(1973) (“an advertiser who make a false claim for his product in the hope that, though most
will not believe him, some people may, is a liar”).
34
Paul Faulkner, What is Wrong with Lying?, 75 PHIL. & PHEN. RES. 535 (2007).
35
Andreas Stokke, Lying and Asserting, J. OF PHIL 33 (2013).
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It looks, then, that common accounts of lying apply to the seller’s
conduct in the hypothetical. Turning to the claim that seller’s conduct also
amounts to a kind of “cheating,” we do not have the benefit of the same longstanding conceptual analysis of the amorphous concept of “cheating” that we
have with respect to the concept of “lying.” Nevertheless, without attempting
to work out a general definition of cheating, it seems likely that charging
someone a price wholly out of line with the market price of a service, and
substantially higher than what the seller himself would ordinarily charge
other buyers, qualifies as cheating on a colloquial understanding. Such
conduct is regarded as cheating because it fails to abide by prevailing norms
– not positive legal rules but generally stated “economic laws” that predict
homogenous pricing and the perceived social order of the market. 36 Those
implicit rules usually demand that any given seller charge no more (or not
substantially more) than other sellers, and that she charge all buyers the same
price without price discrimination.37 Charging a buyer more relative to other
sellers and buyers can be thought of as unfair because it fails to abide by the
unwritten rules of market exchange, which are ordinarily self-enforcing.
Even if we think that price discrimination is not inherently problematic (and
even potentially efficient and progressively distributive), it might warrant
suspicion if sustained price discrimination over time involves some kind of
deception.38
Price discrimination in this case has the effect of altering the parties’
share of the transactional surplus, and might actually make the transaction a
losing transfer for the buyer. That is, the buyer would gain more from the
transaction than would the seller but for the seller’s lie. While people tend in
experiments to expect an equal division of the gains from trade 39, such a
division would only take place in practice where parties have equal
bargaining power.40 In consumer transactions in competitive markets (where
36

See Kahneman, supra note 22.
We do not usually expect fine-grained price discrimination in practice or in theory
because it is too costly for sellers. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000).
38
See Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 41, 80-84 (2014) (discussing price discrimination and deception); Mark
Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 66 TENN. L. REV. 317 (2002).
39
See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 210-14 (1995) (reviewing ultimatum bargaining
experiments); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 251, 253-348 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
40
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the
Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 615 (2001) (if “the parties have equal bargaining
power” they “will share equally in any gains from mutual trade”); Dotan Oliar, The
37
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seller has no market power), consumers are accustomed to reaping almost all
of the transactional surplus.41 Seller’s conduct in our hypothetical is a
marked contrast. His overcharging of the buyer exploits a contextual
advantage with the result that he benefits more from than the transaction than
he ordinarily would, and at the direct expense of the buyer.
Again, the aim in this discussion so far has not been to definitively
establish that seller’s conduct qualifies as lying and cheating. In fact, I will
revisit the above analysis later. The goal was only to set out a tentative set of
plausible judgements. The following section generates a conflicting set of
plausible judgements.
B. Self-Help and Civil Disobedience
Many readers may see the logic of lying and cheating as more readily
applicable to the hypothetical than the language of self-help and civil
disobedience. The aim of this section is not to definitively show that the
seller’s assertions and pricing are ultimately justified but only to make a
compelling case that they might be. Again, the goal is to see that the seller’s
conduct is likely to be appraised quite differently depending on whether on
adopts the vantage point of interpersonal morality or the macro perspective
of distributive justice.
First, we consider how the seller’s conduct might be understood as a
form of self-help. Calling it self-help suggests that seller’s conduct is
remedial and responds to inadequate state action. Although in the usual
model of self-help the underlying wrong is private and prior to state inaction,
here the underlying wrong is public. Since whether there is a wrong of
distributive justice in a given society and what should be done to correct it
are quintessential political questions, one has to reject a conceptual barrier by
which public rights and wrongs play out in an insulated sphere and cannot as
a matter of principle give rise to private recourse. One does not, however,
have to contend that in a well-ordered society, people are entitled to
unilaterally adjust their share of resources by taking from others, by way of
contract or otherwise. The self-help here is only plausibly legitimate where
the first-choice institutional mechanisms by which to resolve distributive
justice have failed. To the extent a seller is simply wrong about background
injustice, he is outside the bounds of the alleged license to lie. Even though
Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Infliction
of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1009 (2012); Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening
Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 49 (1999).
41
Mark Seidenfeld, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (1996).
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it is always unsettling to allow individuals to take matters into their own
hands at the expense of others, the argument for self-help will cast the
procedural defect in the seller’s conduct as reflective or symptomatic of
background injustice rather than an independent wrong. 42
Of course, the chosen method of response to the underlying public
wrong—lying—is a prima facie private wrong in itself. We invoke the selfhelp label here in typical fashion—defensively—to justify an action that
would otherwise be impermissible. But it is not literal ex-post self-help: No
one is claiming that the seller should have the power to demand that an
incredulous buyer who buys at a low price return a portion of her consumer
surplus back to the seller.43
Applying the concept here requires that we identify more specifically
the wrong to which the seller responds, that is, the wrong for which he
effectively compensates himself without relying on ineffective or unavailable
state remedies to which he would in principle be entitled. 44 There are two
kinds of wrongs in the air that could fit the bill: the collective wrong of
distributive injustice, or the individual wrong that the buyer might commit in
attempting to win a substantial, if not majority, share of the gains from trade.
Although these framings are importantly distinct from one another, I hasten
to emphasize that in both cases the underlying wrong cannot be conceived
except by reference to the background—and public—wrong of distributive
injustice. Even if our buyer wrongs the seller by leveraging all her bargaining
power, her conduct is wrongful only because of background distributive
injustice.45
42

Andrew Gold has argued that “it is doubtful that conformity to the nemo iudex principle
is always required in order for other types of justice to legitimately be obtained”. See
Private Rights and Private Wrongs, 115 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1071, 1093 (2017).
43
It is operating as a moral privilege. See Zoe Sinel, De-Ciphering Self-Help, 67 U.
TORONTO L. J. 31, 50-51 (2017).
44
I am not claiming that the seller’s lying is plausibly encompassed by any existing legal
doctrine of self-help. See F.H. Lawson, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW, 2D ED. 1 (1980). But
many legal concepts piggy-back on moral ones, and we might expect that the individuals
are morally entitled to pursue some recourse against wrongdoers even where the state does
not officially allow it. That is, we might recognize self-help even where it is not part of the
remedial scheme recognized by the state. In these cases, the requisite state failure lies not
in failing to uphold a legal right by way of its own enforcement powers but in its failure to
recognize the primary wrong at all. Nevertheless, as I will argue infra, withholding
adequate enforcement of the primary wrongdoer’s rights (here, the buyer’s rights under
consumer law) may implicitly sanction the seller’s self-help after all.
45
Contracting parties typically exercise bargaining power, as in the case of a successful
business buying assets from a struggling firm. We do not ordinarily treat such market
behavior as wrongful. The exercise of market power is only problematic in our
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In order to recognize the seller’s conduct as self-help against the first
type of wrong, a collective wrong, we have to accept that there is distributive
injustice in the society in which the transaction takes places, and that this
represents a wrong to each individual who is worse off than she would be
under just institutions. We would then further have to conclude that lying
about the material of which a scarf is made is an appropriate form of selfhelp, i.e., that it imposes burdens fairly and proportionately. By contrast, a
seller who would lie about the purity of medicine or baby formula is not just
lying and effecting a de minimus monetary transfer; such a seller would
inflict bodily harm. Whether or when it is ever appropriate to physically hurt
someone to correct distributive injustice is beyond the scope of this
discussion: I assume the transfer in our case is small.
Even if the transfer is small46, in order that it not be arbitrary, we have
to explain why any particular buyer appropriately bears the cost of selfhelp.47 In relying on collective wrongdoing, we avoid characterizing the
individual buyer as culpable. But we still need to find her responsible for the
collective wrong—she must stand in the right relation to it—such that it is
fair that she bear some of the costs associated with the state of injustice. 48 In
other work, I have argued that the doctrine of unconscionability sometimes
operates to allow a party to avoid a contractual obligation when the
hypothetical because of background injustice. For this reason, neither way of
understanding the buyer’s conduct is as a simple bilateral wrong. Cf. supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text (discussing the employment discrimination example).
46
The de minimus nature of buyer’s monetary loss is still significant in that the degree of
‘fit’ required is less than in the case of a more dramatic loss. For example, we might think
we need only a reasonable basis for believing that a particular buyer is responsible; if the
prospective loss were grave, then we might require something approaching certainty.
47
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206, 257 (rejecting redistribution in contract law as “completely
haphazard”); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995) (“Critics further argue that the welfare
system provides a more equitable way to redistribute wealth than legal rules do, because
legal rules redistribute wealth only to people who happen to be injured or people in the
class of those likely to be injured in a way that can be redressed by courts--a small and
arbitrarily selected portion of the needy population.”).
48
See Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 93
(1995) (“Corrective justice concerns the rectification of losses owing to private wrongs. In
contrast, distributive justice concerns the general allocation of resources, benefits,
opportunities, and the like. The duty to repair under corrective justice is agent specific-only wrongdoers need make up the losses of others. The duties imposed by distributive
justice are, in
contrast, agent-general--everyone has a duty to create and sustain just distributions.”)
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transaction exploits and exacerbates distributive injustice. 49 In our
hypothetical, the advantaged buyer is advantaged vis a vis the seller by virtue
of distributive justice; she profits from it. Moreover, her expected gains from
the prospective transaction unmarred by dishonesty are possible only because
of that injustice. Finally, because seller’s margins are driven to zero in a
competitive market, the distributions of gains from an honest sale will
exacerbate background injustice. These considerations justify holding her
responsible for the moral upshot of the transaction even if she is not culpable
for it.
Indeed, the primary advantage of this first “collective wrong” account
is that it does not treat the buyer’s willingness to buy at market price as an
independent wrong. It thus avoids the implication that such transactions must
be avoided generally.50
Importantly different from cases of
unconscionability, the buyer in our hypothetical behaves as she is expected
to do. She conforms to market norms. Because the totality of those
institutions that authorize her behavior is unjust, the license she derives from
them is defective. But she has not overstepped the bounds that have been
socially constructed for her, and on which—absent extraordinary
circumstances—she is entitled to rely. The market has enough redeeming
features, and is sufficiently bound up with our entire social structure, that we
cannot afford to treat its imprimatur on conduct as wholly inert without
making moral life incompatible with ordinary life as we know it. 51 It alters
the normative character of conduct taken under its auspices even if it cannot
wholly redeem it.
Nevertheless, given the moral taint on acts that depend on unjust
structures, we should also consider a potential wrong by the individual buyer.
On this alternative, “individual wrong” account, we would argue that the
buyer is not just responsible for the background wrong of injustice but herself
49

See Bagchi, supra note 13.
There are people who structure their lives to ensure that all their market transactions
occur on ‘fair terms,’ not only vis a vis their contracting partners but also with regard to the
suppliers and workers that appear earlier in the transactional chains that lead up to their
own direct purchases. However, it is extremely burdensome and limiting to live this way.
And it is reasonable to suppose that while it might be admirable or virtuous to do so, it is
unlikely to be morally compulsory. See Samuel Scheffler, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 19-22 (1994) (on demandingness as a constraint on moral theory);
Bernard Williams, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 99-100 (1973); Liam Murphy, The
Demands of Beneficence, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 267, 275 (1993).
51
For an elaboration of the argument that moral theories and the demands they make are
appropriately constrained by the requirement that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
people should be allowed to devote their lives primarily to their own self-authored projects.
See id.
50
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stands to wrong the seller. The seller on this argument appears to claim
something more like self-defense than self-help. Let us call this the selfprotection claim.52 The idea is that a person is entitled to take steps to prevent
an imminent wrong where there is no mechanism of the state that will prevent
it, and no adequate legal redress. It is better to call this self-protection than
self-defense because the alleged imminent wrong is the buyer’s purchase of
the scarf at market price, not any criminal conduct or free standing wrong
under public law.
The self-protection argument only gets off the ground if the buyer’s
quite ordinary market behavior is actually a wrong to the seller. This claim
may be supported by certain powerful lines of critique proffered against the
Rawlsian idea of the basic structure as the site of distributive justice.
Many authors have doubted that political liberalism or egalitarian
justice can be sustained absent individual attitudes that are other-regarding in
the marketplace.53 G.A. Cohen famously rejects the assumption in Rawls
that, because individuals maximize their own wealth, material incentives are
required to induce the talented to work. 54 He argues that “social justice
requires a social ethos that inspires uncoerced equality-supporting choice.” 55
Although he expressly sets aside “the choice whether or not to comply with
the rules of such structures,” he concludes that “principles of distributive
justice…apply…to people’s legally unconstrained choices” or “to the choices
people make within…legally coercive structures”.56 Others are not prepared
to go so far in their interpretation of the difference principle but similarly
conclude that principles of justice create some demands on individuals. 57
Michael Titelbaum argues that “[t]he types of attitudes that lead individuals
to support the two principles of justice are not compatible with just any kind
of behavior in their private lives.”58 Seana Shiffrin argues that, since in a well52

Cf. Kagan, supra note 2, at 116 (discussing how lying in self-defense may lie outside the
scope of the moral constraint against lying).
53
See generally Joshua Cohen, Taking People as They Are?, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 363
(2002) (on the role of an egalitarian ethos in making egalitarian justice compatible with
political liberalism).
54
G.A.Cohen, Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 3, 8-10 (1997).
55
Id. at 13.
56
Id. at 3.
57
Michael Titelbaum, What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?, 36 PHIL &
PUB. AFFAIRS 289, 295 (2008) (arguing that Rawls’ account of people’s “sense of justice”
applied only to voting and officialdom”). Titelbaum allows for individual decisions that
disserve the worst-off where “necessary for the development and exercise of the moral
powers.” Id. at 319.
5858
Id. at 299.
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ordered society, citizens accept the public justifications for public
institutions, they will be committed to the view that talents are arbitrary from
a moral point of view and for this reason would be unjustified on insisting on
material incentives for use of those talents. 59
Following Cohen, the typical example in the discussion of egalitarian
ethos is a talented individual who must decide whether to demand high
compensation on the labor market. But the logic applies to consumer
transactions as well. To the extent distributive justice requires that
individuals act in the marketplace in a way that advances the interests of the
socially disadvantaged, the buyer in our hypothetical commits a wrong -- and
perhaps wrongs the seller -- by insisting on the advantages she enjoys by
virtue of her status as a privileged consumer. The seller might appropriately
and defensively respond by denying the buyer that advantage by the only
means available to the seller.
The argument for civil disobedience is still trickier but also serves to
capture the basic intuition that the injustice against which the transaction
takes place creates some license for the seller. Civil disobedience is usually
taken to have a number of elements, though unsurprisingly, there is no single
list on which everyone agrees. The main requirements are that it involve an
illegal action, committed openly, nonviolently, conscientiously (deliberately
rather than impulsively), with the intention of frustrating a law and accepting
the repercussions under the legal system.60 Seller’s conduct seems to fail at
least two of these requirements: It appears to be neither open nor undertaken
with the purpose of frustrating a law.
These are important elements of civil disobedience. Rawls argued
specifically that civil disobedience is not “covert or secretive,” it is “a
political act not only in the sense that it is addressed to the majority that holds
political power, but also because it is an act guided and justified by political
principles.”61 Kimberley Brownlee argues that to remain silent casts doubt
on the sincerity of [the protestor’s] conviction that the conduct [being
protested] is seriously wrong.”62 Rawls addresses behavior that protests
distribution in particular and suggests that violations of the difference
59

Seana Shiffrin, Incentives, Motives and Talents, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 111, 121
(2010).
60
See Hugo Bedau, Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Justice, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 51 (ed Bedau, 1991).
61
See Rawls, supra note 24.
62
Kimberley Brownlee, CONSCIENCE AND CONVICTION: THE CASE FOR CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE 29 (2012).

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382019

principle do not lend themselves to civil disobedience because of the
complexity of the principle’s application, and because “it is difficult to check
the influence of self-interest and prejudice.” He concludes that “the
resolution of these issues is best left to the political process.”
Since seller does not announce his own deceit, is presumably
motivated by self-interest, and responds to precisely the kind of distributive
injustice that Rawls regards as too plagued with uncertainty to justify civil
disobedience, it is not obvious how we can characterize seller’s conduct as a
kind of civil disobedience. We can get this perspective off the ground though,
if we revisit the assumptions about seller’s conduct that I have made thus far.
In particular, we might upon reflection conclude both that seller’s
conduct is open and that it is motivationally connected in the right way with
background injustice. Finally, we might find that even if the precise demands
of distributive injustice are uncertain, sellers can reasonably conclude that the
structure in which they operate is unjust.63 Seller’s conduct might be open in
the sense that the assertions they make are easily proven false and they do not
take any steps to avoid that disclosure. In fact, most buyers might recognize
the falsehood. Although the assertion still qualifies as a lie inasmuch as it
aims to deceive some fraction of the listeners to whom it is addressed, it is
open in the sense that it is made with the expectation that most listeners will
recognize it as false. Seller’s lie is a bald-faced lie, and open for just that
reason.
The seller is not motivated to expose or protest injustice in the typical
sense associated with acts of civil disobedience. But we have reason to be
wary of the scholarly consensus that demands such high-minded purpose of
would-be protestors. Although there have been historical periods in which
every day people engaged in mass civil disobedience, most of the time, only
the socially privileged are in a position to challenge law in the way that the
concept of civil disobedience seems to require. Although the moral license
to disobey law depends to some extent on failure of democratic institutions,
only those who believe they have the power to effect change through their
actions will engage in civil disobedience. Individuals who are largely
invisible to society will have no expectation that their failure to obey a law
will cause anyone to reconsider the justice of the law they broke. In order to
conceive civil obedience in less elite terms, we might expand it to include
disobedience of laws that the law-breaker justifies to himself by reference to
the injustice of the law. Many socially disadvantaged people will not expect
63

For an account of the subtle ways in which the fact of injustice might figure into the
psychology of resistance, see Ann Cudd, ANALYZING OPPRESSION 190 (2006).
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a wide audience for their behavior, and they will rightfully doubt that a public
audience will glean from their law-breaking just the message of protest that
a law-breaker might intend. But to the extent injustice plays a role in the selfunderstanding of a law-breaker, it might meet a modified version of the
purpose test traditionally included as an element of civil disobedience.
Perhaps we need to develop concepts that capture the idea of resistance
outside of civil disobedience as such.
Tommie Shelby’s recent book defending at least forms of legal
noncompliance—where such conduct does not violate natural duties—seems
to capture the idea of resistance that does not amount to civil disobedience,
strictly speaking.64 But even Shelby distinguishes between politically
motivated dissent, which he characterizes as derivative from a duty of selfrespect, and entirely self-interested, private action. 65 Since the lying at issue
in our hypothetical is directed to other citizens, and because the duty to speak
truthfully might be a natural duty, seller’s conduct might not fall within even
Shelby’s account of resistance. I have assumed that seller aims only to
recover a larger amount of the transactional surplus, not to change—or even
protest—the basic structure of society.
Because it is not my aim to elaborate a general theory of resistance, I
do not attempt to advance further a defense of seller’s lie as legitimate
resistance, let alone civil disobedience. But the idea of resistance continues
to do work for us as we deconstruct the political nature of self-help in this
context. After all, self-help in private law is usually responsive to purely
private wrongdoing, and some readers may feel uneasy about the application
of the self-help concept to our seller for that reason. Yet the element of
political resistance in seller’s conduct is not enough to redeem it on traditional
understandings of civil disobedience. Seller thus risks falling into a peculiar
gap in our theoretical constructs surrounding how individuals may respond
to wrongdoing: Injustice in the marketplace is usually private and small on
the margin—it materializes by way of small private transactions—but it is
only unjust in light of broader structures that are not the doing of any single
contracting party. Individual acts of resistance are of a similar, mixed
character, and thus risk being both too public (in justification) to qualify as
self-help and too private (in motivation) to qualify as civil disobedience.
The result is that none of the concepts of self-help, self-protection or civil
disobedience applies neatly to seller’s conduct. But even if those labels do
not apply, they get at the idea that social injustice may create individual
64
65

See Shelby, supra note 10.
Id. at 221.
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license. The next part attempts to reconcile the indictment on interpersonal
moral grounds with the defenses that seller might muster from the perspective
of political morality. I focus on the defense of self-help.
II.

Reconciliation

The task of reconciliation assumes its possibility. We might abandon
the project by pronouncing the interpersonal morality of exchange and the
political morality that governs exchange irreconcilable, derivative from two
separate moral spheres that do not allow for integrated analysis. But this
delivers the unsatisfying result that the seller’s conduct is both wrongful and
justified.66 To gain traction on the moral upshot of his conduct, we must
either draw jurisdictional lines that avoid conflict between the two moral
perspectives, or resolve them substantively. In the first section below, I
attempt the first strategy of separation. It fails. I then attempt a second
strategy, specification. The latter approach helps carve out a potential
justification for seller’s prima facie wrong.
A. Ordered Spheres
One way to handle the apparent conflict is to say that political
morality creates a license that it is improper to use, in the way it might be
improper to insist on a property right to disadvantage a person of superior
need. For example, it would be wrong to refuse to lend a car to someone who
needs to go to the hospital but the legal system does not recognize any duty
to lend one’s car. On this approach, we effectively relegate interpersonal
morality to extra-legal space and allow the politics to fully occupy the legal
terms. Sellers would be wrong to lie and cheat but, in light of their own
disadvantage, the law could decline to offer buyers any remedy; or at least,
the legal regime should not be designed to express moral opprobrium.
Interestingly, such a view bears some similarity to the position that
economically privileged individuals might behave wrongly from the
standpoint of ethics when they exploit their advantages in the marketplace
66

It would be coherent to think the conduct is both wrong and excused but the argument
here is importantly not an argument for excuse. The argument is not, for example, that
natural feelings of resentment or alienation incapacitate poor sellers to the point where they
cannot be expected to comply with moral or legal obligation. Such arguments are
descriptively implausible (and offensive, to boot). The claim on the table is that they
should be exempted from a universal moral obligation but rather that the obligation is not
universal, and in particular, it does not apply under the circumstances of the hypothetical
sale. The claim under consideration is not that vendors are not responsible for their lies but
rather that they are entitled to lie.
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but their behavior does not have any significance from the standpoint of
public justice.67
Although such a separation formally manages the conflict, it is
unsatisfactory on both fronts: It indicts the seller from a moral perspective
more categorically than is warranted. And it offers no legal protection to
buyers at all, which exaggerates the bounds of any license for seller.
We could try the opposite tack, more familiar to legal theory. We
could insist that the political claims of the seller be dealt with entirely through
public law, and insist that private law track the interpersonal moral
obligations. That is, to the extent seller is disadvantaged by distributive
injustice, his recourse is political action. He should vote, mobilize, run for
office and protest in the park – but he may not expect his legal rights and
duties vis a vis particular private individuals to adjust based on background
injustice.
I have elsewhere argued extensively against this “division of labor”
between private and public law.68 Without rehearsing all the arguments, it is
worth distinguishing between the pragmatic and principled arguments for
such a division. Pragmatic arguments to the effect that private law is an
ineffectual means of redressing distributive injustice are compelling but they
invite context-specific empirical inquiry and they do not apply to arguments
that private law should take into distributive injustice because it alters the
moral position of the parties to contract, not in order to advance material
equality directly. Principled arguments fail because they falsely assume that
the moral valence of individual conduct does not turn on background
institutions, and that individual consent to contract obviates any background
claims that parties to contract might have had against one another. If we

67

Cf. Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality and Publicity, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 225,
234 (19980 (“[S]ome choices, although they may be profoundly influential, cannot be
regarded as according with, or violating, public rules. Consequently the nonpublic strategies
and maxims that individuals employ in making those choices need not be assessed as just or
unjust.”). See also Kok-Chor Tan, Justice and Personal Pursuits, 101 J. PHIL. 331, 334
(2004) (“Institutional egalitarianism” does not require as a matter of justice that people “be
egalitarian in their interpersonal decisions and actions within the rules of the basic
structure.”). Both Williams and Tan conclude that any individual duties that attach to the
social advantaged are not a matter of justice.
68
Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract in eds. Klass, Letsas, & Saprai,
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2014); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive
Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 105 (2008).
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accept that distributive justice constrains the bounds of the permissible, then
the content of interpersonal duties must shift to accommodate its demands. 69
In the end, attempts to relegate interpersonal and political duties to
separate spheres do not respond to the underlying feature of the problem. The
seller’s conduct is not separately wrongful and defensible; it is wrong only to
the extent it is not justified. We need an integrated account that allows us to
judge his actions all things considered. Similarly, any account of the
governing contract law that divorces it entirely from interpersonal morality
is at odds with the basic structure of contract law, which depends heavily on
concepts of voluntariness, promise and consent that originate in the domain
of private morality.
B. Specification of Lying
A more promising approach is to reconcile the two moral narratives
by further specification. That is, if we press harder on the question of what
makes lying wrong, we might conclude that lying in this context lacks some
features of ordinary lying that make the latter wrongful. It could be that lying
by the seller does not ultimately qualify as lying at all; or his lies are justified,
or; his conduct is excused.70 Although I am not attempting here to defend
specification over balancing or any other method of sorting out practical
conflict as a general matter71, it is important to my project that I am not
arguing that the seller’s actions may be justified all things considered—
indeed, I am not prepared to defend that claim, which is in some sense broader
and in other respects more modest.72 I am identifying grounds on which we
can argue that his lie is justified, i.e., that he does not wrong the buyer by
lying to her; and so I will focus on considerations relevant to the wrongfulness
of lying rather than moral considerations exogenous to the lie.
We have already discussed whether the seller’s conduct meets the
accepted criteria for lying. I will not pursue further the argument that seller
69

Cf. Kenneth Baynes, Ethos and Institution: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 37 J OF
SOC. PHIL. 182, 194 (2006) (“the requirements of democratic equality themselves help to
define what is private and what is public, and thus what is or is not appropriately a more
direct site of social justice”).
70
Cf. Joseph Margolis, “Lying is Wrong” and “Lying is Not Always Wrong”, 23 PHIL. &
PHEN RES. 414, 415 (1963).
71
See H.S. Richardson, Specifying, Balancing and Interpreting Bioethical Principles, 25 J.
MED, PHILOS. 285, 289 (2000) (describing specification as a method of resolving moral
conflict); T.M. Scanlon, WHAT WE OWE EACH OTHER 197-202 (1998) (same).
72
It is more modest because it allows that his conduct may be wrong even if it is a justified
lie. It is ambitious because it limits the reasons that might redeem him to those relevant to
the morality of lying.
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is not really lying at all.73 Our aim is to explain why seller’s conduct may
not be wrongful, not to explain why he should not be held responsible. Thus,
we are looking for a morally operative feature of his actions or their
circumstances, not something in seller’s capacities that might mitigate the
presumptive wrong of lying. That is, we are looking for justification, not
excuse.74 In Shiffrin’s terms, I am exploring whether the seller’s lie takes
place in a “justified suspended context,” or one where the speakers’
insincerity is “reasonable and justified.”75
The root of the justification should lie in the same circumstances that
centered the discussion of self-help and civil disobedience, namely,
background injustice. Interestingly, Macintyre attributes to John Stuart Mill
the belief that “[h]abitual lying is…the natural state of those who were both
uneducated and subjected” and describes falsehood as “a universal
concomitant[] of oppression”. Mill believed that Indians were pathological
liars for this reason. Although neither Mcintyre nor Mill seems to have
regarded the phenomenon of mass lying as justified, the observation does
raise the question of why it might be that oppressed groups would engage in
more lying.76 It is not clear that Mill was in a position to observe whether
Indians lied more than others as a general matter. But perhaps we can read
his statements as the more modest empirical claim that Indians regularly lied
to the British.
One way to understand the phenomenon, that sheds light on the matter
of our seller, is that the risks to civilization posed by lying are not so
categorical as our earlier discussion of lying made them out to be. In
particular, those risks might be contained when lies are not told
indiscriminately but only in delimited contexts. Thus, the ability of human
beings to know something of each other and the world might not be
jeopardized by poor sellers lying to rich buyers if the practice of lying is
clearly circumscribed both in the minds of sellers and buyers (when they
come to learn of the lie).77
73

See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
For the distinction between justification and excuse, see George P. Fletcher, The Right
and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954 (1985); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing
Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (1984).
75
Shiffrin, supra note 28, at 16.
76
Some studies suggest that lying may be especially prevalent in highly stratified societies
and may be directed by both social “superiors” and social “inferiors” against one another.
Honesty may be an “in-group” practice. See J.A. Barnes, A PACK OF LIES: TOWARDS A
SOCIOLOGY OF LYING 83 (1994).
77
This argument only considers the risks of social contagion, i.e., a general undermining of
the practice of truth-telling, or perhaps interpersonal communication itself. A separate
74
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Moreover, it might be that the benefits of a practice of truth-telling,
including the relationships of trust of which it is a necessary part, may be so
absent from the relationship between people in highly stratified groups that
there is little lost by lying. Bernard Williams alluded to this possibility. He
described truth as “a form of trustworthiness, that which relates in a particular
way to speech.”78 But he went on to say that “[i]n trying to understand
Sincerity…we cannot simply assume [relations of trust]. We need to consider
the various kinds of communicative expectations that obtain between people
who have different kinds of relations to one another.” 79 The question of
whether the expectation of trust is warranted is not morally neutral. We need
to consider whether a given listener is “unoffending” or “someone who no
longer deserves the truth.”80 In our context, we must consider whether buyers
can legitimately expect the truth from sellers.
Why should buyers not expect the truth? One possibility is that
buyers do not trust sellers as a descriptive matter.81 While they might update
their epistemic beliefs about the product in light of what a seller claims, they
do not trust the seller in the sense of relating to the seller as a human being
with whom the buyer shares a common fate, such that each takes interest in
the well-being of the other.82 The same background institutions that produce
inequality are likely to produce such alienation. Absent trust, duties from
sellers to buyers--including truth-telling—might not apply. Alan Strudler,
for example, distinguishes sharply between two situations: While it is
“always morally unacceptable to deceive a person in a way that breaches his
trust, unless that deception is necessary to defend against a grave wrong…it
may be morally acceptable to defend a person in the absence of trust if that

issue is the risk of self-contagion. That is, it might be that lying to some buyers
undermines sellers’ propensity to tell the truth in other situations. They might become
habitual liars. I set aside this concern because it speaks to the virtue ethics of lying, and not
the question of interpersonal obligation, i.e., whether sellers wrong buyers.
78
Bernard Williams, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 94 (2002).
79
Id. at 111.
80
Id. at 119.
81
Cf. David Wood, Honesty, in ed. Alan Montefiore, PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL
RELATIONS (1973) (arguing that a husband who perpetually distrusts his wife is not entitled
to the truth and, more generally, that the significance of honesty depends on particular
social relations).
82
Even where buyer are inclined to believe sellers, their attitude is not properly described as
trusting. The reliability of someone who is merely self-interested to speak the truth is better
described without invoking the concept of trust. See Alan Strudler, Deception and Trust, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION (ed. Clancy Martin, 2009).
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deception is necessary to defend against an action that may thwart one’s
legitimate interests.”83
One might worry that permitting lies in responsive to social alienation
is counterproductive because it will only result in further alienation. This is
almost certainly true but the argument for moral license is not based on a
claim that it will cure social stratification, or inequality, or any other social
ill. The claim is that those who bear the burdens of existing injustice are
exempt from some of the prohibitions that take just relations among
individuals for granted. We might compare the argument that lying by
vendors undermines relations across social groups to complaints about selfsegregation in school cafeterias. I refer to the phenomenon that minority
students will often sit together in cafeterias, rather than integrating into whitemajority tables.84 It is perverse to complain that such self-segregation
undermines community feeling; it is the racism that motivates selfsegregation that undermines community. While self-segregation by a group
that has not been subject to race-based oppression may be wrong, selfsegregation by minorities usually responds to the background wrongs
associated with racism and it is intended to ameliorate the burdens of racial
status. Refusing to recognize a responsive moral license only ensures that
the personal costs of background injustice are borne more completely by its
primary victims.
Defending the seller’s lies on grounds of the buyer’s lack of trust has
its limit. Such an account places a great deal of weight on the role of trust in
generating a duty not to lie. Although it is an important way to talk about
lying and its wrong, it seems inadequate because it implies that lying requires
some kind of underlying relationship to be even a prima facie wrong. This
goes too far – we are only looking for an account of contingent justification.
In fact, even Strudler allows that deception may be justified absent trust only
where it protects “legitimate interests.”85
Moving out of the trust and truth framework, we could think about
lying in Kantian terms as improper use of a person as a means to one’s own
ends, effectively usurping buyer’s decision-right to contribute to the seller’s
ends, or not. But a seller may be released from any duty to defer to the
buyer’s right to decide whether to buy his goods (based on accurate
83

Id. at 152
Whether their conduct is properly categorized as self-segregation is already doubtful.
But for purposes of this analogy we can assume that minority students to some degree
voluntarily choose to consort with other minorities over white students.
85
Id.
84
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information) as a result of her participation in a social structure by which the
seller is used as a means to generate unjust advantage for buyer. That is,
while lying is a kind of disrespect, the duty to respect might require mutuality,
and the disrespect embedded in unjust institutions might justify some forms
of reciprocal disrespect. Kant would not endorse this move because his form
of deontic thinking does not adjust rights based on the noncompliance of
others. But a requirement of mutuality echoes the principle of reciprocity
that motivates the familiar duty of fair play.
Mutuality or at least some kind of joint engagement may be quite
central to how we understand verbal exchange and the accompanying duty to
speak the truth.86 […] If the listener does not engage with the speaker on
terms that justify an expectation of the truth, then she may have effectively
authorized the lie or even bear responsibility for it; the lie would then extend
the conditions of interaction and would not violate the autonomy of the
listener.87
Still, institutional disrespect cannot license disrespect toward other
citizens generally, so we need an account of why seller is justified in engaging
in the particular kind of disrespect that is lying about his goods. Why does
the background wrong of distributive injustice relieve sellers of the duty of
truth-telling to buyers, as opposed to the duty to abide by parking regulations?
Here we can incorporate the reasoning by which we earlier cast seller’s deceit
as a form of self-help. Lying is justified where truth-telling would facilitate
a wrong against the speaker by the listener. As in the self-help discussion
above, we can frame the wrong as aggregate or individual. Truth-telling by
the seller would as a practice worsen his material position and thereby
aggravate the distributive injustice reflected in his social position. Truthtelling by the seller in a given transaction would enable the buyer to extract a
substantial portion of the gains from trade, contrary to her duties as a socially
advantaged participant in the market. In either case, the seller’s lie mitigates

86

Lies must be assertoric, in that they assert something to be true. Patrick Leland argues
that speakers only make assertions where they assume responsibility to justify their
assertions if challenged, as part of a process of “rational engagement.” Patrick Leland,
Rational Responsibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies, 75 ANALYSIS
550, 551 (2015).
87
See Glen Newey, Political Lying: A Defense, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 93, 105-6 (1997)
(discussing the relationship between legitimate expectations, autonomy and lying and
allowing that “lying is prima facie wrong, but…its wrongness is conditional on its violating
the autonomy of its (intended) victim)”).
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an ongoing harm and prevents its imminent worsening. It is justified on those
grounds.88
Just as important to the background and prospective harm to seller are
the benefits and harms to the buyer. It is important that the seller has reason
to believe that the buyer is part of the group that unjustly benefits from
background injustice. And it is important that he reasonably believe that, but
for his lie, the buyer will benefit disproportionately from their exchange. The
background unjust benefits enjoyed by the buyer make her loss in this
particular transaction a mere mitigation. And her willing participation in a
transaction that would worsen the inequality that exists between her and the
seller mark her with a distinctive responsibility that justifies the seller’s
imposition of a loss on her.
One might wonder whether the implication of the analysis of the
buyer’s position is that the seller’s lies are only justified when he is right
about the buyer, i.e., when she really is rich. Or perhaps, the likelihood that
he will be wrong in a number of cases renders the lies unjustified altogether.
There are at least two reasons to think that the seller’s uncertainty about the
status of any given buyer does not importantly affect the moral calculus here,
as long as his assumptions are justified as a matter of probability, i.e., if he is
right most of the time.
The first consideration is that the harm that seller is licensed to impose
on buyers is a relatively trivial one. It is unlikely that anyone who will suffer
greatly from a loss of about $20 will be on the market—even a street
market—for a cashmere scarf in the first place. And, of course, they are not
literally deprived of $20 but simply have an inferior scarf, so no important
moral interest is in jeopardy. The analysis would be entirely different if the
seller were selling baby formula or medicine. In this case, whether the buyer
is privileged or not, her interest in physical integrity is of a qualitatively
different nature than the seller’s interest in either mitigation or protection,
and misrepresenting the nature of the product would not be justified on
grounds of either self-help or self-protection.
88

My argument resonates with Strudler’s claims that “the norms of self-defense may be used
to vindicate deception that aims at fending off the prospect of economic harm.” Id. at 145.
However, Strudler allows the defense only to protect proprietary information that your
adversary in a negotiation has no right to know. Id. at 146. For the argument to extend to
the hypothetical transaction, it requires separately showing that buyer has no right to know
the truth with respect to the product she is buying. There is no reason to think that Strudler
would sign on to that proposition, though there are reasons (set out in main text) that buyer
may have no such right.
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The second consideration that allows the seller to reason
probabilistically about the buyer’s status is the nature of the impersonal
platform in which seller and buyer encounter one another. Street markets are
impersonal places. All the calculations that go into the parties’ terms of
exchange are set by their probabilistic knowledge of the market. This is not
a context where buyer can reasonably be expected to be treated as a unique
individual. Together with her low stakes, market context entitles the seller to
calibrate his treatment of the buyer based on the little he knows about her.
C. Specification of Cheating
I turn now to a far briefer discussion of cheating, or the overcharging
relative to other sellers and buyers. The general expectation that sellers will
not charge certain buyers more than others seems legitimate only before we
learn of substantial differences among sellers, and among buyers. Once we
learn that sellers face different costs, have different needs and enjoy different
levels of opportunity, it is less surprising that they might not all charge the
same price. Similarly, once we learn that buyers differ in their purchasing
power and interest in buying a good, it is not surprising that they would pay
different prices for it. Of course, it is usually the case that it is not possible
or worthwhile for a seller to attempt to discriminate among buyers. But their
self-restraint does not reflect a moral obligation. We recognize an obligation
against nondiscrimination only where the group that would be disadvantaged
is in fact a generally socially disadvantaged group. Our practice is consistent
with the principle proposed by Anthony Kronman with respect to advantage
–taking in a transactional setting. Advantage-taking of a given sort is
permissible, on his view, only where a rule allowing it works to the long-run
advantage of the disadvantaged.89 It is likely that some kinds of fraud or
deception – watering down milk, for example – would harm low-income
consumers. Rules that regulate price discrimination between low and high
income buyers, however, would protect high-end buyers at the expense of
low-income sellers. Thus, there is no reason to endorse a principle of general
nondiscrimination among buyers. Sellers are not only legally but morally
free to overcharge customers, and it is not properly characterized as
“cheating” after all.
III.

Implications for contract theory and doctrine.

The discussion above suggests that interpersonal private moral
obligation depends on background political justice. It should be easier to
89

Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 492
(1980).
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establish that interpersonal legal obligations (private law obligations) should
also depend on background political justice. Many legal observers reject the
very idea of private law as a body of law animated by distinct principles from
those that drive public law.90 Those scholars should directly embrace the idea
that contract is subject to the same principles of political morality that
constrain other legal institutions that are integral to the basic structure of
society. Other scholars regard private law as importantly different from
public law because it entitles individuals to hold other private persons
accountable on the express grounds that they have been wronged. 91 Private
law theorists of this sort too should consider private law within the domain
of distributive justice if the interpersonal moral obligations that underlie
private claims themselves depend on distributive justice.
Even if the permeability of private law to political justice is
established as a theoretical matter, the transaction we have studied in depth
reveals why it is challenging to regulate contract by reference to political
principles. To the extent that the moral defect of the transaction lies in the
basic structure alone, there is no reason that a particular buyer should pay for
it with a poor quality scarf. She would be no more responsible than anyone
who accepts a large tax refund, or anyone who does not add some extra
amount to her tax submissions based on an estimation of how much more she
should owe. While a beneficiary of unjust tax laws may have an imperfect
duty to help the disadvantaged, she is not responsible for any margin of
disadvantage suffered by any particular person. What distinguishes the buyer
in our hypothetical?
Locating responsibility in the buyer of the scarf pins a great deal on
the happenstance of her encountering a dishonest street seller. But he is not
her friend, she is not involved in his life, she does not owe him anything more
or less than any other citizen owes every other citizen. Why her? The trick
lies in finding an account of her transaction that is particular without falsely
characterizing it as personal. Her admittedly arbitrary encounter with the
street seller puts her in a relationship with him—to be sure, a short and
impersonal one—but one that is distinguishable from her fully anonymized
interactions with the state. It is enough to set her apart from other advantaged
people, and to justify his placing a special burden on her—albeit a small
burden, proportional to her role in the larger injustice that has put seller in his
place.
90

See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1645 (2012) (describing “private law skepticism”).
91
Id. at 1650 (defending concept of private law and introducing idea of “new private law”);
Ernest J. Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3 (1995).
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How might we incorporate these propositions, and our extended
analysis of the hypothetical, into our understanding of consumer contract
law? First, we have reason to be less categorical in our protection of
consumers from fraud. The social status of consumers is too heterogeneous
to sustain consumers as a legal status, however politically appealing the latter
status might be.92 Consumer protection has cross-class appeal but consumers
are a disparate class among themselves. Moreover, they are not consistently
either advantaged or disadvantaged vis a vis sellers. The use of consumers
as a group against whose interests whole categories of law can be assessed—
not only consumer law but also competition policy, for example—is
motivated in large part by the sheer numerosity of consumers, which makes
their welfare of preeminent significance in both an aggregate welfare analysis
and a simple political calculus. But we have seen that there are circumstances
under which particular classes of sellers can legitimately regard their buyers
as relatively advantaged, and ‘exploitation’ of those rich buyers is of
complicated moral valence.
Second, consumer contract law can be modified to recognize that lies
are sometimes justified. We can do this directly by adjusting the standard for
what qualifies as a lie, or more indirectly through selective enforcement. For
example, we could systematically refrain from finding that consumers have
relied on representations from street sellers (or at the very least, decline to
recognize any false implicatures from seller’s statements) or we could create
a presumption that any statements by street sellers are “mere puffery” on
which consumers cannot reasonably rely. 93 These legal presumptions about,
or characterizations of, market behavior will have a feedback effect on what
parties’ reasonable expectations really are. The active construction of the
market through legal rules thus allows those rules to ‘improve’ the ethical
code by which participants abide, in the specific sense of rendering them
responsive to other institutional commitments—and deficiencies.
If courts and adjudicative administrative bodies do not alter their
standards, consumer law enforcement agencies can alter their practices.
92

Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection:
A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 109, 114
(2013) (“When consumers are heterogeneous, a one-size-fits-all mandatory approach
necessarily hurts certain subgroups of consumers.”); see also Aditi Bagchi, The Political
Economy of Regulating Contract, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 687, 702-10 (2014) (discussing role
of heterogeneity in regulating contract).
93
See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1395, 1411
(2006) (“Courts deem statements that could not induce reasonable reliance to be
nonactionable puffery.”).
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Politically, street sellers are an easy target. They will offer little organized
resistance to any crackdown on misrepresentations.
(Realistically,
consumers are unlikely to attempt to rescind the sales through a judicial
tribunal, so only administrative enforcement is relevant.) But agency
directors who reflect on their moral mandate can choose to direct their limited
enforcement dollars toward targets that prey on vulnerable consumers, and in
particular, on consumers who are more vulnerable than the sellers who stand
to benefit from their own misrepresentations. In fact, even if an enforcement
officer is not persuaded that deceit is ultimately licensed, it might make sense
for her to abandon enforcement in some contexts in light of the de facto
boundaries of legal enforcement. The law cannot sustain honesty on the
street on its own94, and a second-best of arbitrary intervention might be
worse. If the phenomenon of deceitful self-help is sufficiently pervasive,
cracking down on this conduct may only politicize it, ultimately elevating its
status to that of resistance, if not civil disobedience. On the other hand,
declining to enforce consumer fraud laws in some markets would not kill
misrepresentation as a basis for seller liability as such. It would only treat
the regressive character of some market segment as a trigger for heightened
enforcement scrutiny.
Our argument for why lies by street sellers may be justified was
contingent on the absence of any relationship of trust between seller and
buyer. When a seller communicates with buyer in such a way as to invite
such trust, his lies are probably no longer justified. At least, we have not
explored the ramifications of betraying trust that one has specifically set out
to cultivate. However, while consumer law might very well aim to promote
trust in society writ large by ferreting out sellers who depart from accepted
standards of social conduct, it is not in the business of enforcing the terms of
relationships—just the terms of legal agreements. 95 It should not matter to
the legal status of a seller’s representation whether the seller was very
friendly to the buyer in the course of the sale. This is true even though the
details of the interaction between a seller and buyer may be important to
whether the seller’s deceit is ultimately justified from a moral point of view.
94

See Thomas Carson, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 177 (2010) (“No
police system can effectively police and deter rampant and universal dishonesty in the
economic sphere.”).
95
While all contracts are relational, in the sense that parties to contract often have
relationships with each other that extend beyond the terms of their contract, not all terms of
their private relationship should be of legal import. See Robert Scott, The Case for
Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 860 (2000) (“restricting the role
of legal enforcement to the enforcement of facially unambiguous express terms will (over
time) generate better and more accurate interpretations of those portions of disputed
contracts that the parties choose to reduce to formal, legal terms”).
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More generally speaking, the arguments in this Article do not purport
to establish that disadvantaged persons can lie to and cheat advantaged
persons categorically. There are more fully private realms of interaction
where our political claims are of diminished significance. For example, in a
game of chess, we would not expect the wealthier player to forfeit her rook
at the start. But unlike games, contract is not a realm separate and apart from
political justice. Unlike love and friendship, it does not even aspire to be
separate from state institutions in the self-understanding of its parties. Parties
to contract have chosen to avail themselves of a state-operated regime to
buttress their exchange relationship. To the extent parties in even those
domains of life that seem most distant from political justice, such as marriage,
similarly avail themselves of state machinery, the state may be similarly
obligated to take into account the distributive implications of its policies.
Finally, our study of the exchange transaction here offers some
lessons regarding consideration. Consumer advocates—especially those
protective of low-income consumers—are sometimes tempted to require
something like proportionality of consideration, or equivalence in
exchange.96 In the vast majority of cases, market mechanisms suffice to
ensure that parties transact for goods and services at the market rate, adjusted
for oddities in their transaction. In some cases, avoiding transaction costs,
especially search costs and other information costs, might cause a consumer
to pay far more than she would otherwise pay. 97 Consumer advocates would
have us find these transactions unconscionable on the grounds that buys have
grossly over-payed.
The discussion here should give us pause. Nothing here suggests that
courts should protect vendors who fleece poor buyers. To the contrary, the
upshot of the argument here is that the law should take into account the status
of parties to a transaction because it may inform their duties to each other.
Thus, courts and legislatures should be protective of low-income buyers
because they are poor and not because they are consumers. It should be just
as solicitous of poor vendors. A “class-blind” rule that favors equivalence in
exchange will not properly track moral obligations in exchange.
96

See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981); see also
Nicholas Theocarakis, Antipeponthos and Reciprocity: The Concept of Equivalent
Exchange from Aristotle to Turgot, 55 INT'L REV. ECON. 29, 32-34 (2008) (describing
history of concept of equivalence of exchange).
97
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 288 (1987) (describing trade-off between search costs
and seller price).
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A rule that consistently that simply favors the disadvantaged across
the board is self-defeating because it will result in their effective exclusion
from the marketplace.98 It is an empirical question how protective the legal
rules surrounds exchange can be of the socially disadvantaged in any
transactional setting without triggering perverse effects. 99
In our
hypothetical, it will depend, for example, on whether buyers and sellers
presently respond to legal protection, i.e, whether they would alter their
conduct in its absence, as well as how much knowledge they have of the
frequency with which sellers lie. We hold street sellers accountable for their
lies to the extent those lies undermine the material position of other street
sellers. We should not, however, devote enforcement resources to policing
their lies for the sake of the buyers to whom they lie.
IV.

Conclusion

We started with a hypothetical sale and you, the reader, were cast in
the role of buyer. However, our focus has been on the moral plight of the
seller. His moral situation is challenging. On the one hand, we do not wish
too easily to exempt him from ordinary moral principles – and what is more
ordinary than the admonishment not to lie? We are constituted as moral
agents in part by the moral principles to which we are held, and it would be
actually disrespectful to be less morally demanding of the seller on grounds
of his poverty.
On the other hand, given how vastly disparate our circumstances, it
would be strange if there was no important difference among us with respect
to our claims and obligations to each other. Talking about the justice of
institutions, including the justice of particular laws, can obscure these
differences among us, because the relevant question becomes how
institutions should be modified. We tend to talk about the social measures
that we should take to ameliorate distributive injustice, whether along lines
of class, race, or disability. Those discussions are important but we should
also spend time in the vantage point of individuals. What do we each owe
and to what are we each entitled in the world as we now find it? To the extent
the philosophical literature broaches these questions, we may be too absorbed
98

See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 751, 824 (1991) (“Effective price controls would probably serve, like interest rate
ceilings in general, only to exclude some super-high risk consumers from the…market.”).
99
For a discussion of the likely effects of apparently pro-consumer rules, see Richard
Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
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in the ethics of advantage.100 What do the talented owe the untalented? What
constitutes wrongful discrimination?
This essay is a modest attempt to contemplate the perspective of the
wronged. What is required of them? In particular, how are the obligations
of individuals to other individuals compromised by background justice
deficits? Because the argument that I have proffered to justify the seller’s lie
makes a number of factual and moral assumptions, I do not purport to have
established that seller does not wrong buyer by lying to her. However, I have
illustrated a form of argument that can be used to justify prima facie
wrongdoing that is responsive to background injustice. My tentative
conclusion that poor sellers may be justified in lying to rich buyers is
unsettling in part because it suggests other, perhaps more disruptive moral
licenses, such as those that low-wage employees might hold against their
employers. May low-wage employees take breaks when they are on the
clock, even where they are not legally entitled to those breaks and their
employers prohibit them?101 May low-wage employees falsely claim that
they are ill when they will be terminated for absence on any other grounds? 102
In examples involving low-wage employment, we might be tempted to locate
the primary wrong in the employer, without relying on any political injustice
to justify employee conduct. But it is likely that many employers are
themselves constrained and cannot afford to compensate employees on better
terms than other employers in the industry; the wrong of oppressive working
conditions and avoidable vulnerability to illness is ultimately a public one as
well. Nevertheless, many people will be comfortable imposing some losses
on the particular employers who happen to employ the socially
disadvantaged.
Popular intuition supports the contention that social injustice distorts
the morality of private behavior in other contexts too. Feminists in the
#MeToo movement often claim that women who report sexual harassment or
100

Tommie Shelby’s recent book, supra note 10, is an important exception.
Anecdotal evidence and a comparison of hourly productivity rates as between American
and other OECD workers may suggest that American workers do exactly this. See OECD
Compendium of Productivity Indicators (2018) (comparing GDP per hour worked,
available at https://data.oecd.org/lprdty/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm). Hourly productivity in
the United States was below the OECD average for all but one of the last 20 years.
102
Whether we regard this conduct as permissible might depend in large part on how we
characterize the wrong to which it is responsive. When the underlying wrong is extreme,
as in slavery, we would regard resistance through lying about illness as praiseworthy and
perhaps morally compulsory. See Bernard Boxill, The Responsibility of the Oppressed to
Resist their Own Oppression, 41 J. OF SOC. PHIL. 1, 8 (2010) (discussing measures taken by
slaves to frustrate owners’ objectives).
101
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assault should be believed. Taking any given allegation on its own, this is a
puzzling contention. Why would we believe one sex over the other, without
knowing more? But we already recognize that public reasons justify defaults
of judgment, most notably, the presumption of innocence that applies in the
context of a criminal trial. Perhaps the imperative to remedy public injustice
justifies—in other contexts—adopting a different principle of judgment that
is morally and rationally indefensible but for background injustice. Under
exactly what conditions we can justify a default in favor of believing accusers
is a hard question. It gets at the ultimate question of whether and under what
conditions the disadvantaged can ever justify inflicting loss on the
advantaged in the name of redress, or what proportionality entails in a given
context. Some harms are surely never a permissible response to background
injustice—for example, presuming criminal guilt. But other harms, such as
the loss of certain employment opportunities or prestige to which no one is
in principle entitled, are less obviously off the table. I cannot sort out here the
criteria that must be met before a person or institution deliberately subjects a
man to consequences as a result of an allegation of sexual misconduct but it
is likely that those criteria are different under patriarchy than under
conditions of sexual equality.
To be sure, it is always unfair in some sense when someone is worse
off as a result of wrongdoing outside her control. But in the case of harms
that flow from the oppressed to the privileged, the experience of harm is not
necessarily an injustice separate from the underlying wrong that cast the
oppressed and the privileged in their respective social roles. After all, the
starting point for our inquiry is that people already suffer under injustice.
How closely should we guard the gates around the first-order victims of
public injustice? If we collectively allow harm to lie where it falls, must
those who bear those harms do the same or are they entitled to spread their
suffering around? If we are to reject self-help by the socially disadvantaged,
what alternative course of action is justified in its place? What may they do
about the injustice in which they find themselves? What picture of moral
agency requires that they do nothing more than wait? I worry about a moralpolitical framework that is so unequally demanding of its subjects.
What we owe each other depends on the larger social structures within
which we act, and when those structures are wrongful, it has consequences
for the moral lives of its inhabitants. The consequences of distributive
injustice in particular for our private moral lives are sweeping, almost
breathtaking. The possibility that poor sellers are justified in lying to their
fellow citizens on the streets is among the myriad ways in which background
injustice corrupts civic life in a polity.
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